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have observed an extraordinary development in this area of the law, a development that is particularly striking because it has taken place over so short a period of time. Typically, when one does comparative work and discovered a dramatic change, there are two possible explanations: (i) something has really changed and you are on to a dynamic topic at a liminal time; or (ii) you never understood it well enough the first time. It is my hope that the former is the correct explanation although I cannot deny that I still fear the latter may be the case.
In this paper, I would like to set out the a framework for understanding bias crimes, using the American context as a point of departure. I will then sketch the background of British bias crime law, along with the case for understanding recent developments as indeed an instance of dramatic legal change. Finally, I shall offer some tentative observations as to the reasons for these changes, or at least some of the reasons for these changes, and the implications of these observations for using bias crime law as a window into a society's self-perception as a multi-cultural society.
I. The Nature of Bias Crimes 1 Bias crimes may be distinguished from parallel crimes -crimes that are similar in all manner but for the absence of bias-motivation --on the basis of their particular emotional and psychological impact on the victim. The victim of a bias crime is not attacked for a random reason --as is the person injured during a shooting spree in a public place --nor is he attacked for an impersonal reason --as is the victim of a mugging for money. He is attacked for a specific, personal reason: his race. Moreover, the bias crime victim cannot reasonably minimize the risks of future attacks because he is unable to change the characteristic that made him a victim.
Bias crimes thus attack the victim not only physically but at the very core of his identify. It is an attack from which there is no escape. It is one thing to avoid the park at night because it is not safe. If it quite another to avoid certain neighborhoods because of one's race. This heightened sense of vulnerability caused by bias crimes is beyond that normally found in crime victims. Bias crime victims have been compared to rape victims in that the physical harm associated with the crime, however great, is less significant than the powerful accompanying sense of violation. 2 The victims of bias crimes thus tend to experience psychological symptoms such as depression or withdrawal, as well as anxiety, feelings of helplessness and a profound sense of isolation. 3 One study of violence in the work-place found that victims of bias-motivated violence reported a significantly greater level of negative psycho-physiological symptoms than did victims of non-bias motivated violence. 4 The marked increase in symptomatology among bias crime victims is true regardless of the race of the victim. The psychological trauma of being singled out because of one's race exists for white victims as well as members of minority groups.
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This is not to suggest, however, that there is no difference between bias crimes committed by white perpetrators against people of color and those bias crimes in which the victim is white, as in Wisconsin v. Mitchell. A difference exists between black and Hispanic victims and white victims concerning a second set of factors --that is, defensive behavioral changes. Although bias crimes directed at minority victims do not produce a greater level of psychological damage than those aimed at white victims, they do cause minority bias crime victims to adopt a relatively more defensive behavioral posture than white bias crime victims typically adopt.
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The additional impact of a bias-motivated attack on a minority victim is not due solely to the fact that the victim was selected because of an immutable characteristic. This much is true for all victims of bias crimes. Rather, the very nature of the bias motivation, when directed against minority victims, triggers the history and social context of prejudice and prejudicial violence against the victim and his group. The bias component of crimes committed against minority group members is not merely prejudice per se but prejudice against a member of a historically oppressed group. In a similar vein, Charles
Lawrence, in distinguishing racist speech from otherwise offensive words, described racist speech as words that "evoke in you all of the millions of cultural lessons regarding your inferiority that you have so painstakingly repressed, and imprint upon you a badge of 5 Ibid. The data collected for the study of bias-motivated violence at work was analyzed by ethnicity. There was no statistically significant difference among whites, blacks, and Hispanics in the average number of psychological symptoms experienced as a result of being the victim of bias-motivated violence. Ibid., 29. Moreover, the rates of "ethnoviolent victimization" among whites and blacks in the study were approximately the same. Ibid., 23. 6 Ibid., 29. The defensive behavior changes included such items as staying home at night more often, watching children more closely, trying to be "less visible," or moving to another neighborhood. Ibid., 27-28.
servitude and subservience for all the world to see." 7 Minority victims of bias crimes therefore experience the attack as a form of violence that manifests racial stigmatization and its resulting harms.
Stigmatization has been shown to bring about humiliation, isolation and selfhatred. 8 A individual who has been racially stigmatized will often be hypersensitive in anticipation of contact with other members of society whom he sees as "normal" and will even suffer a kind of self-doubt that negatively affects his relationships with members of his own group. 9 The stigmatized individual may experience clinical symptoms such as high blood pressure 10 or increased use of narcotics and alcohol. 11 In addition, stigmatization may present itself in such social symptoms as an approach to parenting which undercuts the child's self-esteem and perpetuates an expectation of social failure.
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All of these symptoms may result from the stigmatization that results from non-violent prejudice. Non-violent prejudice carries with it the clear message that the target and his group are of marginal value and could be subjected to even greater indignities, such as violence that is motivated by the prejudice. An even more serious presentation of these harms results when the potential for physical harm is realized in the form of the violent prejudice represented by bias crimes. , 416, 420-424 (P. Watson, ed., 1973) . 13 Allport, Nature of Prejudice, 56-59 (discussing the degrees of prejudicial action from "antilocution," to discrimination, to violence).
The impact of bias crimes reaches beyond the harm done to the immediate victim or victims of the criminal behavior. There is a more wide-spread impact on the "target community" --that is, the community that shares the race, religion or ethnicity of the victim --and an even broader based harm to the general society. Members of the target community of a bias crime experience that crime in a manner that has no equivalent in the public response to a parallel crime. Not only does the reaction of the target community go beyond mere sympathy with the immediate bias crime victim, it exceeds empathy as well. 14 Members of the target community of a bias crime perceive that crime as if it were an attack on themselves directly and individually. Consider the burning of a cross on the lawn of an African-American family or the spray-painting of swastikas and hateful graffiti on the home of a Jewish family. Others might associate themselves with the injuries done to these families, having feelings of anger or hurt, and thus sympathize with the victims.
Still others might find that these crimes triggered within them feelings similar to the sense of victimization and attack felt by these families, and thus empathize with the victims.
The reactions of members of the target community, however, will transcend both empathy and sympathy. The cross-burning and the swastika-scrawling will not just call up similar feelings on the part of other blacks and Jews respectively. Rather, members of these target communities may experience reactions of actual threat and attack from this very event. seek safety from an unknown assailant who, having sought them out for identifiable reasons, might well do so again. Members of the community, even those who are sympathetic to the plight of the victim family and who have been supportive to them, may be reluctant to place themselves in harm's way and will shy away from socializing with these victims or having their children do so. The isolation of this family will not be solely their act of withdrawal; there is a societal act of isolation as well that injures both the family that is cut off and the community at large.
Bias crimes cause an even broader injury to the general community. Such crimes violate not only society's general concern for the security of its members and their property but also the shared value of equality among its citizens and racial and religious harmony in a heterogeneous society. A bias crime is therefore a profound violation of the egalitarian ideal and the anti-discrimination principle that have become fundamental not only to the American legal system but to American culture as well. We may thus hypothesize that an assault committed by a Cossack against a Tungus out of bias against the Tungus race would cause no greater injury to the victim, the Tungus community generally, or the entire society, than a simple assault would cause.
The animus against the Tungus held by this individual Cossack would represent only an individual abnormal psychological profile. It would not implicate the broad and deep fabric of racial and ethnic prejudice that such acts implicate in our society. It would be roughly akin to an assault in our culture committed against a victim with blue eyes because the perpetrator held a deep antagonism for all blue eyed people.
Whatever may be said of the Tungus' and Cossacks' society, it is very clear that its level of racial harmony and absence of racial tension is not present in our society with its legal and social history. Bias crimes implicate a social history of prejudice, discrimination, and even oppression. As such, they cause a greater harm than parallel crimes to the immediate victim of the crime, the target community of the crime, and to the general society.
This notion of contexuality in turn helps us understand which categories should and should not be included in a bias crime law. Put differently, it helps us understand how a society ought to go about deciding this issue. The characteristics that yield selfregarding groups which ought to be included in a bias crime law are those characteristics that implicate societal fissure lines, divisions that run deep in the social history of a culture. Here the strongest case is for race. Racial discrimination, the greatest American dilemma, has its roots in slavery, the greatest American tragedy. There is no similar defense provided for oral incitement to racial hatred. criminalized possession of material that is considered to be racially inflammatory.
Possession of written materials or recordings which are "threatening, abusive and insulting" with a view to its being displayed, published, distributed is an offense if the standard elements are met, that is:
" he intends racial hatred to be stirred up thereby , or having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby."
Section 23(1). It is defense to the charge of possession if the defendant did not intent to stir up racial hatred and was not aware of the content of the materials and "did not suspect and had not reason to suspect, that is was threatening, abusive or insulting." Section 23(3). The mental state that applies to each part of the crime of incitement to racial hatred appears to be purpose or knowledge, perhaps some kind of recklessness.
25 25 The route that the law takes to get there is less than direct and therefore less than clear.Under section 18(1), a person has committed an offense if he "uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behavior, or displays any written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting" and either "(a) he intends thereby to stir up racial hatred, or (b) having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby." Section 18(1)(a) is a purpose standard but section 18(1)(b) seem as if it creates only a negligence standard. A standard of only negligence, however, does not comport with the balance of the statute. Section 18(5) creates a defense for an accused who did not intend to stir up racial hatred and who "did not intend his words or behaviour, or the written material, to be, and was not aware that it might be, threatening, abusive or insulting." This is a purpose of knowing standard. "Not aware that it might be" perhaps is a kind of recklessness --but awareness is closer to knowledge.
Two issues bear special mention with respect to the crime of racial incitement.
First, even with the relative easing of the Crown's burden under the Public Order Act 1986, there has been reluctance on the part of prosecuting authorities in Britain to bring cases for incitement of racial hatred. Attorneys General, whose approval is required for charges to be brought under this law, have avoided bringing cases with a strong probability of losing for fear that unsuccessful cases of racial incitement may damage race relations more than they help. 26 Attorneys General have expressed a significant concern with respect to consistency. The concern is that a particular writing should not be deemed in violation of the law in one part of Britain while not in others. One may wonder why this should be a concern. It may very well be that the same writing could foreseeable have very different impact in different areas of the country and even in different communities within any single area. There is no obvious reason why these differences should not be taken into account, particularly if the defendant was aware of these factors. Law enforcement officials have also expressed a more concrete source of Similar provisions apply to the distribution of written material (as opposed to the display of written material governed by section 18(1). Under section 19(1), a person has committed an offense if he "publishes or distributes written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting" and either "(a) he intends thereby to stir up racial hatred, or (b) having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby."
Here too, a standard mere only negligence does not comport with the balance of the statute. A similar defense to that provided under section 18(5) for use of words or behavior and display of written material is provided under section 19(2) for publishing or distributing written material although it appears to present a significantly stronger case for a recklessness standard, and may even hint of a negligence standard. Here, the defense is for an accused who did not intend to stir up racial hatred if he can prove that he "was not aware of the content of the material and did not suspect, and had no reason to suspect, that it was threatening, abusive or insulting."
Here the defendant must prove not only the absence of knowledge but also that he had no reason to suspect that the material was threatening abusive or insulting. This suggests that, if he did have reason to so suspect, he would not have a defense. Therefore, so long as the material met the underlying element of the offense, that is, "having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby," the defendant may be convicted in the absence of purposeful or knowing conduct, and perhaps in the absence of recklessness --he did not suspect but he should have suspected that the material was in fact threatening, abusive or insulting. 26 See Joshua Rozenberg, The Case for the Crown, 138-39 (1987) . frustration in enforcing this law: distributors of hateful pamphlets and fliers, even in a pre e-mail world, are virtually impossible to identify.
Second, as noted above, the provisions of the 1986 law, as was true of its 1976 and 1965 predecessors, did not reach bias crimes per se but rather incitement of racial violence. Perhaps the closest thing to a bias crime law that existed in Great Britain prior to 1998 was to be found in the Football (Offences) Act 1991. This statute proscribes such behavior as throwing objects toward the players or spectators and going onto the playing field. In addition to these more prosaic aspects of regulating conduct during football matches, the Football (Offences) Act 1991 makes it an offense to "take part … in chanting of an indecent or racialist nature." section 3(1). " Racialist chanting is "threatening, abusive or insulting to a person by reason of his colour, race, nationality Thereafter, the Home Secretary ordered the first official study of racially-motivated violence, which was followed by various efforts to measure and to address the problem, culminating, over the past several years with a heightened awareness of the issue.
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Continued study by the Home Office has demonstrated disturbing evidence of the persistence of the problem, but also encouraging evidence of increased understanding of its causes and dimensions. provide for what we would call a "penalty enhancement statute" which increases the severity of a penal sanction for crimes that are "racially aggravated." A crime is racially aggravated when "the offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility based on the victim's membership (or presumed membership) or a racial group; or the offices is racially motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards members of a racial group based on their membership of that group." As of September 30, 1998, therefore, the United Kingdom, for the first time, has a bias crime law.
III. The Broader Framework from which to View Bias Crimes
Early scholarly reaction to the racial violence provisions of the Crime and Punishment is the way in which society expresses its denunciation of wrong doing: and in order to maintain respect for law, it is essential that punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the great majority of citizens for them . . . [T] he ultimate justification for any punishment is, not that it is a deterrent, but that it is the emphatic denunciation by the community of a crime.
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Regardless of one's view of capital punishment, this description of punishment is compelling. Henry Hart saw the expressive value of punishment as the key to the distinction between the criminal and the civil: "What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction, and all that distinguishes it . . . is the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposition."
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What happens when a legislature enacts a bias crime law and it is signed into law?
This act of law-making constitutes a societal condemnation of racism, religious intolerance, and other forms of bigotry that are covered by that law. Moreover, every act of condemnation is dialectically twinning with an act of expression of values, in Durkheim's terms social cohesion. Punishment not only signals the border between that which is permitted and that which is proscribed, it denounces that which is rejected and announces that which is embraced. As racial equality per se becomes a more prominent If a racially-motivated assault is punished identically to a parallel assault, the racial motivation of the bias crime is rendered largely irrelevant and thus not part of that which is condemned. The individual victim, the target community, and indeed the society at large thus suffers the twin insults akin to those suffered by the narrator of Ralph
Ellison's Invisible Man. 35 Not only has the crime itself occurred, but the underlying hatred of the crime is invisible to the eyes of the legal system.
The treatment of bias crimes under U.K. law, both de facto and de jure, is a significant window into the place of racial harmony and equality among the values held by the U.K. polity. The recent legislation along with the widespread public attention to the Lawrence Inquiry and the Macpherson Report demonstrates that these issues are of central concern in the U.K. today, and are in a critical stage of evolution.
35 Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man (1953) .
